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Abstract
We develop a model of cultural transmission where television plays a role in
socialization. We study the coverage of di¤erent cultural traits by a prot maxi-
mizing TV industry and the resulting cultural dynamics. A monopolist covers both
traits but grants more coverage to the most protable group. In a competitive TV
industry each channel specialises on one trait. This might lead to cultural extinc-
tion but only for su¢ ciently large majorities. Cultural extinction is more likely in
a competitive than in a monopolistic TV industry. Overall our model predicts that
cultural extinction can only occur under very special circumstances.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the study of cultural transmission of preferences has mushroomed.1 In
this literature cultural transmission is conceptualised as resulting from two forces: direct
vertical socialization from parents to children and oblique and horizontal socialization by
society at large. Although television has become the primary source of socialization in
many modern societies (Gerbner et al., 2002) its role as an oblique socialization mecha-
nism2 has been ignored in the cultural transmission literature despite the existing evidence
that television can change cultural traits and beliefs.3
In the political debate the idea that television can transform culture has been promi-
nent. An unregulated television industry is sometimes perceived as a threat to cultural
diversity. A common argument for maintaining public television is to ensure that diverse
and high-quality programming is supplied that caters to the entire population, hence to
all communities and cultures.4 Politicians who care about local culture often feel that TV
imports threaten local diversity and argue that TV programs should have the status of
cultural exceptionsand not be subject to free trade, a view that was approved in 2005
1Bisin and Verdier (2010) provide a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical contributions
to the literature.
2In the most standard approach (see e.g. Bisin and Verdier, 2001) the probability to acquire a
cultural trait via oblique transmission equals its proportion in the population, hence the inuence of a
trait through society depends on its size. Saez-Marti and Sjögren (2008) have generalised the oblique
cultural transmission function by formalising merit-guided learning on part of the children by their peers.
Patacchini and Zenou (2011) look at neighbourhood e¤ects. Other papers have modelled education by
schools as additional forms of oblique transmission (see e.g. Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002) or have provided
evidence about the empirical relevance of collective socialisation mechanisms (see e.g. Aspachs-Bracons
et al., 2008).
3This evidence will be discussed in Section 2.
4This argument was put forward by the pioneer in broadcasting economics, Peacock (Towse, 2005).
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by the UNESCO in its Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity. Protectionist mea-
sures have also been passed by the European Union in the 2007 Audiovisual Media Service
Directive. Quotas for home productions are very common around the world. However,
how real is the threat of cultural extinction?
The argument that television can lead to a cultural change and hence might wipe some
cultures o¤ the map is too simplistic, since it overlooks that people who care about their
culture will take this danger into account when deciding their TV demand. Moreover,
an unregulated prot maximizing TV industry optimally chooses the program contents
given peoples demand. The cultural dynamics resulting from these strategic interactions
might not be as simplistic as the political debate suggests.
In the present paper we develop a model of cultural transmission where television,
besides providing entertainment, plays the role of oblique socialization which allows us
to study the coverage of di¤erent cultural traits by a prot maximizing TV industry and
the resulting cultural dynamics. We look at a society with two cultural traits which di¤er
in size, cultural intolerance and advertisement sensitivity. In our model parents have to
decide how much of their free time to invest in socializing their child which is costly.
The rest of the time the child is left to watch television while parents pursue their own
interest.
As in Bisin and Verdier (2001) time spent in socialization determines the probability
that socialization is successful and hence the probability of direct socialization. How-
ever, and this is our main innovation, if direct socialization fails, the child is socialised
by television. As in socialization analysis (Gerbner et al., 2002) we assume that the child
is a¤ected by the entire system of messages received by the television program. These
messages consist of the amount of coverage of each cultural trait which determines the
probability that the child will adopt this trait conditionally on being socialised by tele-
vision. Hence, while watching television requires no parental e¤ort and is entertaining,
parents are aware that television might infect the child with the wrongcultural values.
The television industry is not interested in the propagation of cultural values per se.
Cultural coverage is chosen strategically to maximise prots since it inuences the viewing
time and thereby the advertisement revenue of a rm.
We examine di¤erent industry structures: a monopolistic TV industry, competition
between free-to-air rms, a pay-TV duopoly and a mixed duopoly with one pay-TV and
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one free-to-air rm. We study how the nature of competition a¤ects the coverage of the
di¤erent cultural traits, parentsoptimal time allocation between socialization and TV
time and the long run survival of the cultural traits.
A monopolistic media industry captures more TV time from the most protable
group.5 We show that the protability of a group  and also its coverage  increases
in its size, advertisement sensitivity and cultural intolerance. Since parental socialization
and TV time are cultural substitutes (Bisin and Verdier, 2001), parents belonging to the
less protable group (which would coincide with the minority if groups were symmetric
except for size) socialise more intensively their children. Therefore, a monopolistic media
industry tends to preserve cultural diversity.
With a competitive media industry complete cultural extinction is more likely. When
presented with a choice parents will pick the channel (for their children) that maximises
their utility, by for example granting more coverage to their cultural trait. This makes
specialization by each channel on one single culture a dominant strategy. Both cultures
will survive in the long run, if and only if the competitors specialise on di¤erent traits.
Notice, that competition has a non-monotonic e¤ect on cultural diversity. On the one
hand, competition tends to make rms get attracted to the most protable cultural group
favouring cultural homogenization. On the other hand, separating on di¤erent cultural
targets allows to reduce competition and promotes cultural diversity. As a consequence
when the protability of one group is particularly large, the media industry will cover
that group only, leading to no cultural coverage of the less protable group and its long-
run extinction. The likelihood of cultural extinction is highest under duopoly. When
all channels cover the more protable trait, the incentives to deviate to cover the less
protable trait increase in the number of competing rms. The higher the number of
competitors, the stronger are the forces pushing towards cultural diversity.
The capacity of rms for reducing competition by di¤erentiation is amplied whenever
TV rms can exploit another variable on which to compete such as a fee or the level of
entertainment quality. Therefore, the presence of a pay-TV reduces the likelihood of
cultural extinction.6 Pay-TV rms will charge a positive (indeed maximal) price, if they
5Unless the entertainment value is very large relative to cultural intolerance in which case full TV
coverage of both groups can be achieved.
6The same is true if the entertainment quality is strategically chosen by rms.
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specialise on di¤erent traits and therefore have less incentives to cover the same trait. In
terms of cultural survival, pure pay-TV competition dominates a mixed duopoly which
dominates pure free-to-air competition.
Overall our model predicts that cultural extinction can only occur under very special
circumstances which suggests that the fear voiced by policy makers seems exaggerated.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 motivates our main
modelling assumptions. In Section 3 we present the basic model with symmetric traits
except for size and we solve the model with a monopolistic free-to-air TV industry. Sec-
tion 4 analyzes the di¤erent types of competitive TV industries and their e¤ect on cultural
survival. Section 5 is dedicated to robustness. We show that endogenizing the entertain-
ment value, allowing entertainment to depend on cultural intolerance and coverage or
introducing various asymmetries across traits does not alter our main results. Section 6
summarise the empirical predictions of our model and presents some existing evidence.
Finally, Section 7 discusses avenues for future research and concludes. All proofs not
following immediately from the main text are relegated to the appendices.
2 Motivating evidence
Our model is based on three crucial assumptions: (i) television can lead to cultural
change, (ii) the inuence of TV is bigger the more time children spend watching TV,
(iii) parents are aware of this possibility and act accordingly. In what follows we provide
some motivating evidence for these assumptions.
There is a recent economic literature showing that the messages received by television
may a¤ect a large spectrum of beliefs and behaviours. The Fox News Channel has an
important role in explaining votes in the US (Della Vigna and Kaplan, 2007). Being
exposed to television programs in the Islamic world has an e¤ect on the way people judge
the west (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004). The introduction of TV can have signicant
e¤ects on socioeconomic outcomes in developing countries. La Ferrara et al. (2012)
study the e¤ects of television on fertility choices in Brazil and nd that women living in
areas covered by the Globo signal have signicantly lower fertility.7 Moreover, the share
7Globo is a network that had a virtual monopoly on telenovelas in Brazil.
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of women who are separated or divorced increases signicantly after the Globo signal
becomes available (Chong and La Ferrara, 2009). Using data on ve Indian states Jensen
and Oster (2009) show that the entry of cable TV led to increases in subjective measures
of female autonomy and declines in pregnancy rates. Finally, Olken (2006) studies the
e¤ect of radio and television on social capital in Indonesia. Increased signal reception,
which leads to more TV and radio consumption, is associated with less participation in
social organizations and with lower self-reported trust.
Communication scientists (Shanahan and Morgan, 1999) have been studying how tele-
vision a¤ects culture long before economists. They labeled their eld of studies Culti-
vation Theorybecause exposure to television over time cultivates viewersperceptions
of reality.8 One of the central hypothesis in cultivation research coincides with our as-
sumption (ii), namely that heavy TV viewers are more likely to be socialised by television
than light viewers. This hypothesis was successfully tested by Gerbner already in 1968
within the US. Other studies examine the "cultivation" e¤ects of TV imports. For the
Philippines Tan et al. (1987) showed that heavy viewers of American television evidenced
non-traditional values, more like those shown by the television programs than the tradi-
tional values of their Philippine homeland. Viewers in Australia had di¤erent views of
Australian life if they watched more American television (Pingree and Hawkins, 1981).
The Thai people are becoming more vindictive and are abandoning the traditional for-
giveness derived from Buddhism because of Chinese and Japanese television inuences
(Tan and Suarchavarat, 1988).
The above evidence suggests that TV can lead to cultural change and that its inuence
is stronger for heavier viewers. But are parents aware of this? One of the most extreme
examples of parents worrying that their culture might be endangered by television is
found in Granzberg et al.s (1977) study of the Cree culture: The most traditional people
in Cree society refuse to have TV in their homes or feel it necessary to destroy a newly
bought TV, or at least refuse to allow their children to watch scary programs.
8They argue that Television is the source of the most broadly shared images and messages in his-
tory...Television cultivates from infancy the very predispositions and preferences that used to be acquired
from other primary sources ... The repetitive pattern of televisions mass-produced messages and images
forms the mainstream of a common symbolic environment(Gerbner et al., 1986, p. 17 18).
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3 The basic model
We consider a society with overlapping generations and an innitely lived media industry.
At any point in time, the society consists of old and young individuals with generation size
1. Individuals are born without well-dened preferences and acquire one of two possible
cultural traits when young. At the beginning of each period, the media industry chooses
the coverage of the cultural traits in society (program contents). Each member of the old
generation (adult) has a child (the new generation) and decides how much time to invest in
the direct socialization of the child. The rest of the time the child is left in front of the TV
which has two functions: it provides entertainment and serves as the oblique socialization
mechanism. Parental choices together with media coverage determine the transmission
of cultural values and lead to the socialization of the young generation. Todays children
become tomorrows adults and replace the old generation that dies and the next period
begins.
We start our analysis with the simplest model where cultural traits are symmetric
except for group size. In particular, both cultural groups prefer their own cultural trait
with value V to the other cultural trait to which they attribute value v. Hence,V = V v
measures the cultural intolerance in society. Without loss of generality we refer to trait
1 as the majority trait, i.e. it has size n  1
2
. We analyze di¤erent media industry
structures with one common choice variable, namely the coverage qi of trait i with the
restriction that q1 + q2 = 1. Parents make their time use decisions after observing this
coverage. We normalise the individualsamount of time to 1 and denote by ti the amount
of time devoted by a parent of trait i to the socialization of his child, which determines
the success probability of direct socialization. The remaining time 1  ti; parents let the
child watch TV with a known entertainment value .9 While leaving their children in
front of the TV, parents can pursue their hobbies or work elsewhere in the house. We
therefore assume that educating ones child has a cost beyond the missed entertainment
value from watching TV given by c(ti) = 12ct
2
i .
Parents choose the channel their child is allowed to watch but cannot monitor the
9For the time being we assume that this entertainment value is given and independent of cultural
intolerance and coverage. We will relax this assumption in Section 5.2. We will also allow for the
entertainment value to be chosen strategically by the media industry in Section 5.1.
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content. The danger of letting the child watch television is that the child might get
infectedby the cultural values transmitted by the television program. In other words, if
direct socialization fails, the child is socialised by the TV. Hence, watching TV can lead
to a trait change, the probability of which depends on the coverage of the di¤erent traits
in TV: (1   ti)qi is the probability that a child who has not been successfully educated
by his parent still acquires his parents trait by watching TV while (1  ti) (1  qi) is the
probability of a trait change.
Parents have imperfect empathy,10 i.e. they evaluate their childs utility as if it was
their own. This implies that parents judge the costs and benets of their child watching
TV with their own preferences and decide the childs TV time based on the program
content and their socialization cost.11 The parents maximization problem is therefore
given by
max
ti
(1  ti) + tiV + (1  ti)qiV + (1  ti)(1  qi)v   1
2
ct2i (1)
leading to the parental optimal choice12
ti =
8>><>>:
V (1 qi) 
c
if qi < bq = 1  V
0 if qi  bq: (2)
10While we embrace the imperfect empathy assumption, there is also an ample literature which inves-
tigates cultural transmission without it. See e.g. Dessi (2008) and Corneo and Jeanne (2009).
11We do not need to assume that parents and children watch TV together or watch the same programs.
However it seems that parental TV time is similar to child TV time and that this activity is often
synchronized within the household. Indeed, Cardoso et al. (2010) reveal the widespread inuence of
parental time use on the childs time use: in the three countries analyzed (France, Germany and Italy)
both the mothers and the fathers share of time spent watching TV has a positive impact on the share
of time the youngster allocates to that activity.
12It is immediate to see that the second-order condition for a maximum is satised.
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Equation (2) tells us that parents substitute from the relatively less benecial to the
relatively more benecial activities: TV time 1   ti is decreasing in cultural intolerance
V and increasing both in the entertainment value,  and in the cost of socialization, c.
The expressions also illustrate that socialization and TV coverage are cultural substitutes
and parents therefore free-ride on trait transmission by television. TV time increases
in the coverage of ones own trait. A high coverage of ones own trait, increasing the
probability of keeping the trait, implies zero socialization e¤ort. We assume that
Assumption 1 c  V     0
which insures that parental socialization e¤ort is always smaller or equal to 1 and is
not zero for all possible qi: The case c < V    is empirically less relevant (see the
discussion on the cost of educating ones child) and theoretically less interesting since it
implies no TV time for any q 6= 1 and hence no trait change but also no TV coverage.
Equation (2) gives us the optimal parental choice no matter how media coverage is
determined in the media industry. Next we analyze both monopolistic and competitive
media industries starting with a monopolistic free-to-air TV.
3.1 Monopolistic free-to-air media industry
A monopolistic free-to-air media industry decides the coverage of each cultural trait to
maximise its revenue from advertisement which is given by
 = max
qi
 [n (1  t1) + (1  n) (1  t2)] (3)
where n is the group size of trait 1 and  is the advertisement revenue of the media
industry per unit of time spent watching television which we will refer to as peoples
advertisement sensitivity.13 From (2) we know that for a parent of trait i TV time is 1
if the coverage is larger than bq = 1   
V
. Observe that bq larger than 1
2
is equivalent
13The e¤ect of heterogeneity in advertisement sensitivity and cultural intolerance will be described in
Section 5.3.
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to V > 2. Hence for V  2, the monopolistic media industry can get full TV
time from both traits by setting q1  bq and q2  bq since 2bq < 1. The media industry
can choose an optimal cultural coverage mix that totally satises both groups, since the
entertainment value of watching TV is large relative to cultural intolerance. If instead
V > 2; the entertainment value is relatively small compared to cultural intolerance.
Increasing the time one group watches TV implies decreasing the time the other group
watches TV. Therefore, the media industry chooses to capture more TV time from the
more protable group, which in this context coincides with the bigger group as shown in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Media coverage and prots) The TV coverage and the correspond-
ing prots are as follows:
1. If V  2, then any 1   
V
 qi  V is optimal. Both traits watch TV all the
time and  = .
2. If V > 2, then only the smaller group invests in socialization t2 =
V 2
c
while the
bigger group watches TV all the time t1 = 0. The optimal coverages are q

1 = 1  V ,
q2 =

V
and prots are
 = 

n+ (1  n)

c+ 2  V
c

: (4)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Notice that while group size determines the TV coverage chosen by the media indus-
try, the size of the coverage itself and therefore also the socialization e¤orts by parents
(equation (2)) are independent of group size. This simplies the dynamic analysis which
we undertake next.
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3.2 Dynamics
Group 1 is initially a majority, i.e. n0  12 . At date t+ 1 its group size nt+1 is given by
nt+1 = nt (t1 + (1  t1)q1) + (1  nt)(1  t2)q1 (5)
Trait 1 parents will have a trait 1 child if socialization is successful (with probability t1)
or if socialization fails (with probability 1  t1) and their child is successfully socialised by
television (with probability q1). Moreover, some trait 1 individuals of the next generation
will stem from those trait 2 parents (1   nt) who were unsuccessful at socialization and
whose children were socialised by TV to trait 1 (with probability (1  t2)q1).
If parents do not socialise their children, which happens if the entertainment value of
TV is large relative to cultural intolerance V  2; media coverage fully determines
group size. However, if some socialization occurs, the long run steady state results from
an interplay between direct and oblique socialization.
Bisin and Verdier (2001) distinguish between social environments that act as substi-
tutes or complements to parental socialization. They show that cultural heterogeneity
obtains whenever direct vertical socialization is a substitute to oblique/horizontal so-
cialization. This condition, essentially, requires that parents socialise more intensively
children when their cultural trait is minoritarian. The driving force in our dynamics
(equation 5) is also cultural substitution. If a trait is minoritarian the media coverage
is biased against this trait (Proposition 1) which causes parents to reduce TV time and
intensify direct socialization (equation 2). This insight allows us to conclude that while
for q1 = 0 the steady state converges to n = 0 and for q1 = 1 the steady state converges
to n = 1, only the interior steady state n is stable where
n =
(1  t2)q1
1  (t1 + (t2   t1)q1)
(6)
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and since n0 > 12 the system will converge to
nb = 1 
c
cV   (V   2) (V   ) (7)
obtained by substituting in (6) the optimal media coverage q1 and the corresponding
socialization e¤orts derived in Proposition 1.14 With symmetric cultural traits group size
uniquely determines the optimal media coverage. The group which is initially a minority,
will stay a minority, will get less coverage and exert some socialization e¤ort, while the
initial majority group will entirely rely on trait transmission by the TV.
The following proposition summarises our ndings:
Proposition 2 (Steady states) Let no  12 . Then the stable steady states are as fol-
lows:
1. If V  2; media coverage fully determines group size since parents do not so-
cialise: n = q1 with 1  V  q1  V .
2. If V > 2, then the system converges to nb dened by (7) where only minor-
ity parents socialise and majority parents fully rely on socialization by the media
industry.
Since only the interior steady state is stable, we can conclude that a monopolistic free-
to-air TV industry preserves cultural diversity since both traits survive in the long run.
However, the degree of cultural diversity reected in the relative group sizes depends on
the level of cultural intolerance and the entertainment quality of TV. Cultural diversity
is maximised if V = 2. In this case, the monopolistic TV industry can capture full
TV time of both traits by giving them equal coverage, hence n = 1
2
:15 If V > 2
14Observe that by Assumption 1 nb  12 .
15This equilibrium can be sustained if the entertainment value of TV increases, however, a continuum
of possible equilibria arises and we cannot predict the exact outcome. Since media coverage uniquely
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the initially bigger group will stay a majority in the long run. Its nal size increases in
cultural intolerance and decreases in entertainment quality.16 A higher V or a lower 
forces the media industry to increase the coverage of trait 1 to ensure full TV time from
trait 1, leading to less TV time from trait 2 (Proposition 1). In the limit when  = 0 TV
no longer provides entertainment and its role is reduced to oblique socialization. Parents
will still let their children watch TV, because direct socialization is costly. However, the
majority parents will require full coverage ( q1 = 1 by Proposition 1) not to invest in direct
socialization leading to the extinction of the minority trait. To preserve some degree of
cultural diversity under a monopolistic TV industry, a su¢ ciently high entertainment
value is required since it serves as a counter-balance to cultural dislike.
4 Competitive media industry
We now modify the previous model to allow for a competitive media industry. We rst
consider free-to-air competition (Section 4.1). Second, we study a pay-TV duopolist where
each TV rm has two instruments to maximise prots: the coverage of cultural traits and
the fee charged to viewers (Section 4.2). Next, we analyze competition when there is a
mixed duopoly with one free-to-air and one pay-TV rm (Section 4.3). Finally, we discuss
cultural policy implications of media industry reforms (Section 4.4).
4.1 Free-to-air competition
With a duopolistic media industry individuals will decide both which channel to watch
and for how long.17 Let qji denote the coverage of trait i by channel j where j = I; II.
determines the steady state, there is no path dependence on initial size and the initial majority group
might not be the majority in the long run.
16Its nal size will also be bigger, the higher are parental socialisation costs c (equation 7).
17This setup is similar to Richardson (2006) where two radio channels have to decide the amount of
local and foreign content. However, in Richardson (2006) consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their
taste over the mixture between local and foreign content. In our model each parent prefers the channel
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Parents will choose the channel that gives a higher coverage to their own trait. If both
channels give the same coverage, we assume that they are chosen with equal probability.
The time devoted to socialization by an individual with trait i who is watching channel j
is equal to
tji = max

0;

V
 
1  qji
   =c	 : (8)
Both channels simultaneously decide the coverage of each cultural trait. Each channel
j; taking as given the choice of the other channel  j, decides the coverages qj1 and qj2
(with qj2 = 1  qj1) to maximise its revenue from advertisement given by

h
n
 
1  tj1

1qj1>q
 j
1
+ (1  n)  1  tj2 1qj2<q j2 +   n  1  tj1+ (1  n) (1  t2) =2 1qji=q ji i :
(9)
where 1A is the indicator function which takes the value 1 if A is true and zero otherwise.
Notice that if both channels cover both groups equally (qji = q
 j
i ), they will split the
audience. We now describe the coverage of each cultural trait by the media industry.
Proposition 3 (Competitive free-to-air) For a su¢ ciently large majority n  n where
n =
c+ V   
2c+ V    (10)
only the majority trait will be covered qI1 = q
II
1 = 1. Otherwise rms will specialise on
di¤erent traits, (qI1 = 0; q
II
1 = 1 or q
I
1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0).
18
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3 says that it is always optimal for TV rms to cover only one trait.
In a duopoly, given that channel I has specialised in covering one of the two cultures,
that transmits its cultural trait.
18In the proof we show that there also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium for these parameters.
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there is no benet for channel II from partially broadcasting that cultures trait because
anyone from that culture will strictly prefer to watch channel I and have their children
only exposed to their own culture. Similarly, if the rst duopolist is not specializing,
the second channel can capture the entire market for the biggest (most protable) of the
two cultures. In other words, specialization is a dominant strategy. Which culture(s)
the rms specialise on is the result of two opposing forces. On the one hand, both rms
are attracted to the most protable cultural trait. On the other hand, rms want to
di¤erentiate themselves to reduce competition, separating on di¤erent cultural targets.
As a consequence, when group sizes are su¢ ciently similar the two channels diversify on
covering one cultural trait each,19 while only the majority trait is covered for a su¢ ciently
large majority(n > n).
Specialization on one cultural group is more likely for lower values of cultural intoler-
ance V , higher entertainment value  and higher cost of socialization c.20 The intuition
is simple. Those changes in parameters make socialization more costly or less desirable
and therefore increase the TV time of the group that is not covered. This increase in
minority TV time if it receives no coverage increases the incentive to concentrate on the
bigger group even if the di¤erence in size is not too big.
We now show that the dynamics is rather simple. First, notice that if the majority
is su¢ ciently large (no > n), both rms specialise on this trait, hence the minority
trait will disappear in the long run.21 If, however, 1
2
6 n0 6 n and rms play a pure
strategy equilibrium, i.e. they diversify on covering di¤erent traits, then group sizes
remain constant.22 These insights are summarised in the following proposition.
19Since the channel covering the majority trait makes larger prots, there also exists a mixed strat-
egy equilibrium for this parameter range where both channels cover the majority trait with the same
probability.
20For the formal argument see the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A.2.
21At n both the concentration equilibrium (qI1 = q
II
2 = 1) and the diversication equilibria (q
I
1 = 0,
qII2 = 1) or (q
I
1 = 1, q
II
2 = 0) exist. However, the diversication equilibria are Pareto superior, so we
concentrate on them.
22It is easy to show using standard martingale theory that the mixed strategy equilibrium would lead
to cultural extinction of either the minority or the majority group. Over time the group size will almost
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Proposition 4 For a su¢ ciently big majority n0 > n, the system converges to n = 1:
For a smaller majority 1=2 6 n0 6 n the system converges to n = n0.
In other words, only minority groups that are su¢ ciently big so that one of the com-
peting rms is willing to cover the minority trait can survive in the long-run.
Competition has a non-monotonic e¤ect on cultural diversity. In line with the above
intuition, it is simple to show that as the number of channels competing in the media mar-
ket increases, the result that both cultural groups receive full coverage is more and more
likely. Consider for instance three channels, then qI1 = q
II
1 = q
III
1 = 1 is an equilibrium
if  [n+ (1  n) (1  t2)] =3 >  (1  n) that is if n > (2c+ V   ) = (3c+ V   )
which is clearly bigger than n: In other words, as the number of channels increases, the
probability of cultural concentration tends to zero. Our model therefore predicts that
Corollary 1 Cultural extinction is more likely in a competitive media industry than in
a monopolistic market. Moreover, a duopolistic market is the worst case scenario for
cultural survival.
However, a duopolistic TV industry does not always do worse than a monopoly in
preserving cultural diversity. Indeed, as we argued in the previous section, if TV has no
entertainment role, then a monopolistic free-to-air industry automatically leads to cultural
extinction. In this case the only hope for cultural survival is competition. Therefore,
Corollary 2 If the media provides little entertainment value a competitive market is likely
to lead to a larger minority group than a monopolistic one.23
surely fall outside the bounds for which the mixed strategy equilibrium is dened (1 n  n  n) leading
to full coverage of the group which is the majority when the bounds are threshpassed. While we present
this result for completeness, from now on we will concentrate on pure strategies only in the dynamics.
23Competition will lead to a larger minority size in the long run whenever the initial majority group
size n0 is such that 12  n0  min [n; nb ] where nb is the steady state majority group size under monopoly
(equation 7). Notice that this is always the case for  = 0 and likely to be satised for positive but small
.
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Both groups are less willing to watch TV if the entertainment value is low. This obliges
the monopolist to increase the coverage of the most protable group to capture its entire
TV time leading to smaller minority group sizes in the long run. Under competition,
the very same e¤ect is likely to favour the minority. If both rms concentrate on the
majority trait, the resulting TV time of the minority which is not covered is low which
makes di¤erentiation a more attractive strategy. This e¤ect dominates if the minority is
initially not too small and guarantees its long run survival at its initial size.
4.2 Pay-TV duopoly
In this section we study competition between two pay-TV rms. As in Peitz and Valletti
(2008), we model this as a two-stage game. In the rst stage both TV rms determine
the coverage of each cultural trait.24 In the second stage they set the fee sj a viewer has
to pay. The rest of the model is unchanged. The parents maximization problem is now
given by
max
tji
U i(qji ; s
j) = (1  tji ) + tjiV + (1  tji )qjiV + (1  tji )(1  qji )v  
1
2
ctj2i   sj:
The time devoted to socialization is unchanged and equal to (8). Parents now trade
o¤ coverage and fee and will choose the channel that o¤ers the largest utility, that is,
U ij = max
j2fI;IIg
U i(qji ; s
j): We assume that if both TV rms provide viewers with the same
utility and the same coverage, they are chosen with equal probability. However, if the
utility is the same but coverage di¤ers, the tie is broken in favour of the rm providing more
coverage. The following two fee levels will be crucial in the analysis. Let smax = +V be
the maximum fee that a cultural group that receives full coverage is willing to pay dened
by U ij(1; s
max) = 0. Second, let bs = V   (V   )2 =2c be the maximum fee that a
24We stick to our simple model of advertisement revenue unlike Armstrong and Weeds (2007) and Peitz
and Valletti (2008) who provide an explicit model of the advertisement market.
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cultural group that receives no TV coverage is willing to pay, dened by U ij(0; bs) = 0.
The next proposition describes the coverage of each cultural trait and the fee chosen in
equilibrium for a su¢ ciently low advertisement sensitivity.25
Proposition 5 (Competitive pay-TV) Let  < smax   bs. For a su¢ ciently big ma-
jority group n  n(smax) where
n(smax) =
2csmax +  (c+ V   )
2csmax +  (2c+ V   ) (11)
both rms will charge no fees (sI = sII = 0) and concentrate on covering the majority
(qI1 = q
II
1 = 1) leading to the long-run elimination of the minority. Otherwise both
rms will charge the maximum fee sI = sII = smax and will specialise on di¤erent traits
(qI1 = 0; q
II
1 = 1 or q
I
1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0 ), so that group sizes remain constant.
26
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The only di¤erence compared to the case with two free-to-air TV rms is that com-
petition between two pay-TV rms increases the area where the TV rms diversify their
coverage (n(smax) > n) and hence survival of the minority group is more likely. This hap-
pens because pay-TV rms have another variable besides coverage on which to compete,
reinforcing the principle of di¤erentiation. Diversication under pay-TV allows rms to
charge smax making deviations to specializing on the majority trait less attractive than
under free-to-air competition. Moreover, n(smax) increases in smax =  + V , hence the
higher the entertainment value (or the value given to ones own trait), the more n(smax)
25If the advertisment sensitivity was too high ( > smax   bs) the pure strategy equilibria with special-
isation would be destroyed by the incentive to cover the highly protable because of the revenues from
advertisement majority group.
26There also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in this case which is characterised in the proof of the
proposition.
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and n drift apart.27 Under pay-TV competition a higher entertainment value increases
the chances of cultural survival of the minority.
4.3 Mixed duopoly
We now analyze competition with one free-to-air and one pay-TV rm. Without loss of
generality let rm I be the pay-TV. Then
Proposition 6 (Competitive mixed) For a su¢ ciently big majority group n  n(bs)
where
n(bs) = 2cbs+  (c+ V   )
2cbs+  (2c+ V   ) (12)
the pay-TV will charge no fees (sI = 0) and both rms will concentrate on covering the
majority (qI1 = q
II
1 = 1) leading to the long-run elimination of the minority. Otherwise
rms will diversify on covering one trait each and rm I will charge sI = bs leading to no
change in group sizes. Specically, while for su¢ ciently small majorities 1=2  n  n
(where n is dened by (10)) either rm might cover the majority trait28 (qI1 = 0; q
II
1 = 1
or qI1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0), for intermediate majority sizes, n  n  n(bs) there exists just
one diversication equilibrium in which the free-to-air rm covers the majority group
(qI1 = 0; q
II
1 = 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The pay-TV rm charges sI = bs under diversication of coverages and therefore has
less incentives to deviate to covering the majority group (losing the fee) than a free-
to-air rm. As already said having a second variable on which to compete reinforces
27Indeed, the survival of the minority group under pay-TV competition becomes more likely for higher
entertainment values @n(s
max)
@ > 0 which stands in sharp contrast to free-to-air competition where
@n
@ < 0:
28There also exists a mixed equilibrium in this case as described in the proof of the proposition.
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the capacity for di¤erentiation that is strongest when all competitors can exploit various
dimensions on which to compete. Consequently, the area where the TV rms diversify
their coverage is largest for competition between two pay-TV, intermediate when there is
a mixed duopoly with one free-to-air and one pay-TV rm, and smallest with two free-
to-air rms (n(smax) > n(bs) > n). Comparing the di¤erent market structures we can
therefore conclude that
Corollary 3 The presence of pay-TV rms decreases the probability of cultural extinction.
This probability is smallest if all competing rms are pay-TV rms. Moreover, higher
entertainment values amplify the advantage for cultural survival of pay-TV relative to
free-to-air competition.
4.4 Implications of media industry reforms
The above market structure comparisons allow us to discuss cultural policy implications
of media industry reforms. In particular, we want to understand the impact of liberalizing
the media industry starting with initially one free-to-air rm.
Our previous analysis reveals that the e¤ect of opening up the market to competition
depends on the relative protability (group size) of the cultural traits when this reform
is implemented. Competition has two opposing aspects: it attracts rms to the most
protable market, but rms also want to di¤erentiate in order to reduce competition.
If the latter aspect dominates, opening up the market to competition stabilises cultural
diversity. Otherwise, the minority will not receive any coverage and if no further reform
is undertaken disappears from the cultural map in the long-run. Policy makers who will
typically have imperfect knowledge of the underlying parameter values therefore face a
di¢ cult decision.
If the minority size is stable under the free-to-air monopolist, nothing is to be gained
by opening the market. In the best case scenario, competition leaves the minority group
unchanged. However, if the minority size is shrinking, competition might avoid a fur-
ther reduction in cultural diversity. If allowing for another free-to-air competitor is not
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su¢ cient, liberalizing the market further by letting rms set fees might do the trick. Oth-
erwise the number of competitors has to be increased su¢ ciently until one rm is willing
to serve the minority.
Notice however, that while liberalizing the market might avoid a further reduction in
the minority size, an increase can only be achieved by regulating a monopoly. Our model
suggests that if the minority group is judged too small, regulators should oblige the free-
to-air monopolist to increase its entertainment quality leading to a bigger minority group.
Once the group size is judged to be su¢ ciently big, the market can be deregulated and
should be liberalised directly to pay-TV competition which grants the highest chances
for cultural survival. In other words, cultural concerns can justify the existence of a
regulated monopolist only temporarily. Once group sizes are su¢ ciently balanced, tough
competition on several dimensions and with the maximum number of possible competitors
will do the job.
5 Robustness
To check for the robustness of our results we introduce variations in our basic model
(free-to-air media industry). We endogenise the entertainment value in two ways (i) it is
strategically chosen by rms (Section 5.1) and (ii) it depends on cultural coverage and
cultural intolerance (Section 5.2). In Section 5.3 we discuss how our results are a¤ected by
various asymmetries across traits such as di¤erent advertisement sensitivities and cultural
intolerance.
5.1 Endogenous entertainment
Since entertainment attracts audience and is costly to produce, it is reasonable to assume
that rms might also choose the entertainment value. To illustrate how this a¤ects our
results, we will work with a very simple setup: the entertainment value is low L unless
the TV rms pay the cost k > 0 to produce a high entertainment value H , and we dene
 = H   L > 0. In the rest of the analysis we assume that V > 2H ; that group 1
is the majority n > 1=2; and that coverage is chosen before the entertainment value.
Monopoly: A monopolistic media industry will prefer the high entertainment value
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whenever it leads to higher prot.
Proposition 7 (Monopoly entertainment) If k < =c the monopolist chooses H
if the majority is not too big, i.e. n < 1  (ck=2) and L otherwise. For k  =c
high quality is never chosen.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
High quality will only be chosen if its cost is not too high and the majority is not
too big. Recall that the monopolist covers the minority up to the point where it still
gets full TV time from the majority. The TV time of the minority increases with quality
and decreases with socialization costs. Therefore if socialization costs are not too high,
the monopolist is more likely to produce high quality, the bigger the size of the minority
group. The monopolist is compensated for the extra cost of high quality by the additional
revenues it receives from more minority TV time. Entertainment quality is chosen due
to su¢ cient cultural diversity. Societies with small minorities are condemned to low
entertainment quality in a monopolistic market.
The resulting dynamics is exactly as in the baseline model and high quality is chosen
in the long-run if and only if nb(H)  1   (ck=2) where nb(H) is obtained by
substituting H in (7).
Free-to-air competition: Let us study what happens when there are two free-to-air
rms that choose programsquality. With respect to the baseline model we assume that
both channels simultaneously decide the coverage of each cultural trait and only after
observing the coverage they simultaneously choose the quality jl where l = L;H. The
rest of the model is unchanged. The parents maximization problem is now given by
max
ti
U i(qji ; 
j
l ) = (1  ti)jl + tiV + (1  ti)qjiV + (1  ti)(1  qji )v  
1
2
ct2i
Since there is no heterogeneity within groups all the individuals of a group choose the
same TV time and the same channel. Moreover, people watch the channel that o¤ers
the largest utility, that is, U ij = max
j2fI;IIg
U i(qji ; 
j
l ): If both channels o¤er the same utility,
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they get half the audience. This can only happen if both rms cover the same trait,
since U ij(1; 
j
L) = 
j
L + V and U
i
j(0; 
j
H) = V   (
V jH)
2
2c
; so that it is always true
that U ij(1; 
j
L) > U
i
j(0; 
j
H): Proposition 8 describes the pure strategy equilibria for a
su¢ ciently low cost of providing highly entertaining programs.29
Proposition 8 (Competitive entertainment) Let k  [ (c  (V   L) + 2H)] =2c.
For a su¢ ciently big majority group n  nk where
nk =
 (c+ V   H) + 2ck
 (2c+ V   H)
(13)
both rms will choose H and concentrate on covering the majority (q
I
1 = q
II
1 = 1) leading
to the long-run elimination of the minority. Otherwise rms will provide L and will
specialise on di¤erent traits, so that group sizes remain constant.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
Similar to the case of two pay-TV rms, the two-dimensional nature of competition
benets the minority group by increasing the attractiveness of diversication in coverage.
If both rms cover the same trait, the competition in quality is very tough. This makes
deviating to cover the other trait more protable because it reduces the competition in
quality (nk > n).30 Smaller minorities are now able to survive in the long run, but the
29This assumption on k avoids multiple pure strategy equilibria in the second stage of the game and
hence guarantees a unique solution.
30If the timing was reversed, i.e. entertainment value was chosen before coverage, the two-dimensional
nature of competition would also benet the minority, but results become much messier (partly due to
multiple equilibria in the second stage of the game). Moreover, results depend on whether or not a high
quality rm can capture the entire market if the other rm has chosen low quality in the rst stage of
the game. In this case, an equilibrium in high quality always exists. If being a high quality monopolist is
not protable, the cuto¤ for both rms choosing high quality and concentrating on the majority trait is
still given by (13). The major di¤erence with the other timing structure is that for intermediate majority
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price is a lower entertainment value.31 This result stands in contrast to the monopoly case
where su¢ ciently big minorities lead to a high entertainment value for everybody. Under
competition the minority survives, since it gets full coverage from one of the channels.
Therefore, unlike in the monopoly case its TV time is independent of program quality.
If on the other hand, the minority is su¢ ciently small, a monopolistic rm will forego
the production of high quality entertainment since the additional costs outweighs the
additional prots from the minority group, while a competitive industry will ght over
the majority and produce high entertainment quality leading to the elimination of the
minority trait in the long run.
5.2 Entertainment depends on cultural coverage and intolerance
Our basic model assumes a constant entertainment value. While this is a reasonable
starting point, it is more realistic to assume that the entertainment value might depend
on the trait covered by the TV and on the parents degree of cultural intolerance. People
tend to particularly enjoy programs that positively represent their own culture. Black
audiences prefer soap operas with mainly black actors except for the baddies while
white audiences prefer the opposite (Poindexter and Stroman, 1981).32 One way to cover
a culture is to give the message of its cultural superiority in the stories told by television.
These assumptions can be captured by the following functional form
i(qi;V ) =    (1  qi)V + qiV
sizes and su¢ ciently low k, rms might choose to produce di¤erent qualities leading to specialisation on
di¤erent traits thereby guaranteeing the survival of both traits in the long run.
31With the present timing structure, the lower entertainment value is served to both cultural groups. If
the timing of the decisions was reversed, the majority will get a high entertainment value for intermediate
group sizes while the minority is served low entertainment.
32Atkin (1992) analyzes US television series with minority-lead characters and nds that the observed
increase in Black-lead characters is due to commercial purposes: Back-lead characters attract the Black
audience that has become a highly sought after target by advertisers.
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with ;  and  all positive. The rst term represents a pure entertainment e¤ect, the
second is a negative e¤ect from watching programs covering the other trait, and the third
is a positive e¤ect from watching programs covering ones trait. The last two e¤ects are
both weighted with the degree of cultural intolerance.
It is immediate to see that the total entertainment from watching TV is always in-
creasing in the coverage of ones trait qi: Moreover, i(qi;V ) can be both increasing or
decreasing in cultural intolerance and the sign of the derivative depends on the cover-
age of ones trait qi: Specically, total entertainment from watching TV is increasing in
cultural intolerance if and only if the coverage of ones trait is su¢ ciently large, that is
qi > = ( + ) : Finally, the cross derivative with respect to coverage and intolerance is
always positive: the more intolerant you are, the more you enjoy your trait being cov-
ered by TV. It is easy to see that none of our qualitative results are a¤ected by these
changes. Following the same steps as in the previous analysis it can be shown that the
time devoted to watch television, is ti = max f0; [V (1  qi)  i(qi;V )] =cg and that
the condition V ? 2 now becomes V (1 +    ) ? 2. A monopolistic media indus-
try with V (1 +    ) > 2 will choose coverage q1 = V (1+) V (1++) and both traits will
survive in the long run. Similarly, the qualitative results under competition remain the
same. Hence, our analysis is robust to these changes.33
5.3 Heterogeneous cultural groups
Our results are robust to the introduction of additional sources of heterogeneity, namely
di¤erences in advertisement sensitivity and in the degree of cultural intolerance.34 As
before, the coverage of a cultural trait depends on its overall protability but now size
33The above formulation can also capture the case where the entertainment value depends only on
cultural coverage. In this setup V = 1;  = 0 and  = . In this world the parameter area where a
monopolistic TV industry can capture full TV time of both audiences disappears and the interval for
which both groups are covered by a competitive media industry is now larger, reducing the danger of
cultural extinction.
34A formal analysis can be found in the online appendix or in the working paper version Hauk and
Immordino (2011).
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is only one of the factors inuencing protability which also increases in the relative
advertisement sensitivity and in the relative cultural intolerance of a group.
A monopolistic TV industry will give more coverage to the more protable group to
capture its entire TV time. Moreover, for given group sizes, an increase in the relative
advertisement sensitivity of one group with respect to the other and/or an increase in
its relative cultural intolerance increases the probability that this group gets more cov-
erage. Consequently, with a monopolistic free-to-air TV, we get the following empirical
predictions. Increasing the relative advertisement sensitivity of one group with respect to
the other and/or its relative cultural intolerance, increases the probability of moving to a
steady state in which this group is larger.
With a competitive media industry, there is again a non-monotonic e¤ect on cultural
diversity. Potential competition is toughest when groups are similar in size. Therefore for
intermediate group sizes the media industry specialises on di¤erent traits guaranteeing
the long-run survival of both traits. Which group sizes counts as an intermediate group
size now depends on the relative advertisement sensitivity and cultural intolerance. The
interval of intermediate group sizes is largest the more similar groups are in their relative
advertisement sensitivity and their level of cultural intolerance. Outside this interval
media rms concentrate on the most protable group.
The previous discussion adds a couple of new empirical predictions: A decrease in
the size of a group, its advertisement sensitivity or its degree of cultural intolerance will
decrease the probability that the media industry will concentrate to cover that group. Fi-
nally, the comparison between monopolistic and competitive media industry is una¤ected:
competition is still more likely to lead to cultural extinction.35
6 Discussion
Our model derives three sets of predictions concerning TV demand, TV supply, cultural
35Poor minorities could have a higher cost of socialising their children being therefore obliged to rely
more on TV time. This can be captured by our model assuming di¤erent parental costs of socialisation
ci. However, the idea that a culture will not disappear when the TV market is monopolistic is robust to
this extension.
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dynamics and the resulting steady states.
On the demand side the model provides two novel predictions: (i) TV time is
(weakly) increasing in cultural coverage; (ii) TV time is (weakly) decreasing in cultural
intolerance.
Some indirect evidence for these predictions can be found in the communication lit-
erature. For a given program quality people have a clear preference for home produced
TV products. Moreover, this preference might persist even if home production implies a
reduction in quality. It is likely that this preference stems from peoples perception that
home produced products are important for the preservation of culture. In a case study on
Australia Papandrea (1999) was able not only to detect this preference for Australian TV
products but also to verify that this preference indeed roots in cultural concerns. Using a
contingent valuation approach Papandrea (1999) concludes that the demand for domestic
programming was greater than the level of supply. Quotas for home production are often
not binding due to the high consumer demand (see e.g. Cohen, 2005 for Israel).
In the same vain, cultural proximity has been shown to be a key factor for TV suc-
cess.36 Imported programs that are produced in a culture which is close in terms of
language, dress, ethnic types, body language, denitions of humour, ideas about story
pacing, music traditions, religious elements etc...tend to be more successful: Brazilian
telenovelas dubbed into Spanish are more popular in Latin America than any American
Soap, while Japanese and Chinese television are more successful in Asia than American
imports, to mention a few examples.
There is also abundant evidence of distinct viewing patterns among di¤erent cultural
groups. For example, in their case study on Israel Cohen (2005) and Cohen and Tukachin-
sky (2007) show that viewing patterns di¤er among groups and each group watches the
channel that covers their culture better. Moreover, the most intolerant group, the Ultra-
Orthodox Jews, do not watch TV due to the lack of a purely Ultra-Orthodox channel.
On the supply side our model predicts that the media industry chooses to capture
more TV time from the more protable group, where protability depends positively
on group size, advertisement sensitivity and cultural intolerance. Moreover, competition
does not necessarily lead to all groups getting cultural coverage. While the likelihood of
36See Straubhaar (1991), de Bens and Schmaele (2001), Trepete (2003), Straubhaar et al. (2003), La
Pastina and Straubhaar (2005) and Straubhaar (2008).
27
diverse cultural coverage increases with the number of channels and also if rms can com-
pete in various dimensions, whether di¤erentiation really occurs depends on the relative
protability of the di¤erent cultural groups.37
This supply side predictions are partly corroborated by Cohen (2005) and Cohen and
Tukachinsky (2007) who show that the Israelian TV market has created di¤erent niches
for di¤erent cultures. In this market, all traits are covered except for the ultra orthodox
Jews. Cultural groups are of similar sizes (protability) in Israel so that a competitive
TV industry nds it convenient to cover all of them except for the ultra orthodox Jews
who are very insensitive to advertisement.38 A parallel argument could be made for
commercial radios concentrating on the most protable groups. Siegelman and Waldfogel
(2001) provide empirical evidence that US commercial radio mainly covers white audiences
and underprovides minority listeners (Blacks and Hispanics) who have a very distinctive
taste.39
37There exists several empirical studies (see e.g. Signorielli (1986), De Jong and Bates (1991), Lin,
(1995), Li and Chiang (2001), Van der Wur¤ (2004, 2005)) that look at di¤erent measures of channel
diversity based on program type and check how increased competition a¤ects diversity without getting
a clear answer: diversity measures can vary considerably across markets with similar number of chan-
nels. Van der Wur¤ (2005) suggests that the di¤erent channel diversity might be due to di¤erences in
audience demand for minority programmes, country-specic (cultural-historical) di¤erences in channel
programming or a combination of these factors (p.267). Therefore, as our model suggests, controlling
for cultural aspects of programs and not only for program type, for group size, advertisement sensitivity
and socialisation costs of di¤erent cultures can serve as an empirical strategy to disentangle this mixed
evidence.
38Cultural groups in Israel consist of around 12% Ultra-Orthodox Jews, 18% Arabs, 20% immigrants
from the former Soviet Union while the remaining 50% is split among tradional-Mizrahi, secular-Ashkenazi
and national religious groups (Cohen, 2005).
39We have found no evidence that more intolerant groups should get more coverage. The empirical
test of this prediction requires data on the relative cultural dislike of one cultural trait towards the others
and is left for future research.
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A third set of novel predictions of our model concerns the cultural dynamics: cul-
tural extinction is more likely in a competitive media industry than in a monopolistic
market (except if the media provides little entertainment value). However, the presence
of another variable on which to compete besides cultural coverage (fee, entertainment
quality, etc.) increases the attractiveness of diversication in coverage promoting more
cultural diversity. In other words, cultural extinction is highly unlikely since it can only
occur under very special circumstances.
We are not aware of any studies testing our predictions concerning the cultural dy-
namics directly. However, some e¤orts have been made to study cultural change over
time. Morgan (1986) investigated the e¤ect of watching TV on regional diversity in
the US between 1975 and 1983 examining the General Social Surveys conducted by the
National Opinion Research Centre and discovered that heavy viewers had less regional
diversity than light or moderate viewers.
Other attempts are based on the World Value Surveys. Inglehart and Baker (2000)
nd both a massive cultural change and the persistence of distinctive cultural values.
Especially the broad heritage of a society in terms of religion is shown to leave a deep
imprint on values that endure modernization. The role of the mass media is ignored in
the study. However, in a recent book Norris and Inglehart (2009) take a rst look at the
role of the media for cultural change and conclude that the risks to national diversity due
to mass media is exaggerated.
Disdier et al. (2010) reach the same conclusion. In their paper they o¤er systematic
evidence of the inuence of foreign media on one particular cultural trait, namely naming
patterns in France. Names given to babies are seen as emblematic characteristics of
national cultural traditionsand hence expressions of cultural identity. Disdier et al.
(2010) show that despite the existence of many examples of non-traditional names in
France the aggregate impact of foreign media is modest and has changed less than 5% of
the names.
The above evidence is only suggestive. For a serious test of our predictions one would
need a long panel with data on peoples time use and values, together with data on TV
contents that allow for cultural di¤erentiation between channels. This very demanding
task is left for future research.
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7 Conclusion
In the present paper we have chosen to develop an industrial organization view of cul-
tural transmission and preference evolution studying both the demand and supply side of
television and its resulting inuence on cultural change.
Television does not only provide entertainment but is also an important source of
oblique socialization. To keep the model tractable, we have abstracted from other forms
of socializations like inuence by peers or by the school. This simplication is appropriate
since we study socialization at a very young age, due to our assumption that parents decide
their childrens TV viewing. Therefore, our model cannot be used to talk more generally
about the possible impact of new communication technologies such as internet and social
networking websites on cultural diversity and evolution of preferences. To study the
impact of new communication technology we would need to enrich our model to allow for
socialization to occur partly through role model e¤ects and random social interactions
outside the home which is left for future research.
Our research could also benet from relaxing some further assumptions which we
discuss now but plan to do more rigourously in the future.
Our agents are short-sighted: parents only care about their children and the TV
industry only cares about their present prots. The assumption on parents is consistent
with the entire literature on cultural transmission. But (especially) a monopolistic TV
industry wants to manipulate the cultural dynamics of the groups, if it cares about future
prots. This manipulation is most attractive if the entertainment value is low compared
to cultural intolerance, so that the monopolist can never capture full TV time of both
cultural groups. But if one group got eliminated, future prots are maximised and this
will happen sooner, the lower the coverage of this group in the present. Therefore, the
monopolist faces a trade-o¤, losing some of the present prots for higher future prots.
The outcome depends on how much the monopolist discounts the future. While a very
patient monopolist will manipulate the dynamics and drive one group to extinction, a
su¢ ciently impatient monopolist will behave as the myopic agent in our model.
In our model the degree of cultural intolerance of each group is held constant. In a
complex dynamic model tomorrows cultural intolerance might depend on todays cultural
intolerance, on program content and viewing behaviour. It is clear that an evolving cul-
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tural intolerance can have important implications in a monopolistic market.40 Whenever
more coverage of ones trait leads to more intolerance over time (reinforcement) the initial
minority will disappear in the long-run. Due to the higher coverage the initial majority
will become more radical every period, grow in size and get more coverage next period,
while the initial minority keeps shrinking until it disappears.41
If instead cultural intolerance was a¤ected by grievance, so that the group that is
covered less becomes more tolerant, both groups will be preserved in the long-run. The
initial minority will become more intolerant reducing the minority TV time that the
monopolist can capture while capturing full TV time of the majority. This will eventually
induce the monopolist to switch to capture full TV time from the initial minority leading
to grievance of the initial majority. The monopolist will keep switching between the two
coverages that induce full TV time of one of the groups. Grievance hinders long-run
cultural extinction.
This paper has provided a framework that allows for the discussion of media market
structure and competitive and cultural policy in the media sector. According to our
model TV programs should not be classied as cultural exceptionsand public broad-
casting is rarely justiable on cultural grounds.42 Indeed, if the free-to-air media rm
had the social objective to preserve cultural diversity our analysis suggests that  in
a monopolistic setup this objective would be implementable by choosing a quota for the
minority that uniquely determines the long-run distribution of traits. Opening this market
to competition from a prot maximizing competitor will lead to the preservation of the
minority at the group size when competition was introduced. To see why notice that the
competitor will specialise on covering the most protable group which forces the rm that
cares about cultural preservation to specialise on the minority. Nothing can be done by
40There will be no dynamic e¤ects under competition, since either both groups get full coverage and
the group size stays constant or only one group gets covered leading to elimination of the other group.
41To illustrate this point we postulate a specic functional form in the Online Appendix.
42Another interesting extension is to allow for rms to broadcast multiple channels and o¤er bundles.
Crawford and Cullen (2007) show in numerical welfare simulations that consumers would benet if cable
television networks were o¤ered à la carte. If cultural survival is a concern, this is likely to reinforce their
conclusion.
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this rm to increase the minority size. It can only preserve its size. However, su¢ cient
competition among pure prot maximizing rms will guarantee the same outcome. This
leaves no role for a state channel for the sake of cultural diversity in a competitive world.
A Appendix
A.1 Monopolistic rm
Proof of Proposition 1. The result for V  2 follows immediately from the main text
and the observation that for any 1  
V
 qi  V , the coverage of each cultural we lies above
bq1 = bq2. If V > 2, we proceed in the following way: we divide the possible coverage into
three subintervals depending on whether the TV industry can capture full TV time of one of
the traits. We then determine the optimal coverage in each of them and compare the level of
prots in each subinterval to nd the overall optimal coverage. The rst subinterval is given by
all levels of media coverage that guarantee full TV time from trait 2 and partial TV time from
trait 1, namely q1  V . It is easy to see that qa1 = V is optimal, since (1  t1) is increasing
in q while (1  t2) is constant and equal to 1. Using (3), (2) and qa1 = V ; prots are easily
shown to be equal to a = 

(1  n) + n   c+2 V
c

:We now solve for the last subinterval
where only trait 2 socialises and trait 2 watches TV all the time, namely q1  1  V . Given
that (1  t1) is constant and equal to 1, while (1  t2) is decreasing in q the optimal coverage
mix is qb = 1  
V
and prots are equal to b dened by (4). Finally, in the subinterval where
both traits socialise, namely 
V
 qi  1  V the rm has to maximise
max

V
qi1  V


n

c+   V (1  qi)
c

+ (1  n)

c+   V qi
c

:
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Since the problem is linear, we get a corner solution leading either to qa1 and 
a or to qb1 and 
b.
It is easy to show that a  b whenever n  en = 1
2
.
A.2 Competitive media industries
Proof of Proposition 3. We rst show that (qI1 = 0; q
II
1 = 1) and (q
I
1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0)
are two pure strategy Nash equilibria for all 1=2 6 n 6 n: In those equilibria the channel
(no matter which) covering group 2 gets prots  (1  n) while the only protable deviation
is to cover group 1 only which would give prots 1 =  [n+ (1  n) (1  t2)] =2 where
t2 = (V   ) =c, hence
1 = [c  (1  n) (V   )] =2c (14)
which is not protable for n  n: For the channel covering group 1, instead, prots are equal to
n; while deviating to cover group 2 would give the prots 2 =  [n (1  t1) + (1  n)] =2
where t1 = (V   ) =c, hence
2 = [c  n (V   )] =2c (15)
and this is not protable for n  c= (2c+ V   ) which is smaller than 1=2:
There also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium with pI = pII = c+V  n(2c+V )
V  for all
1=2  n  n where pj is the probability to specialise on the minority trait. The probability pII
must make rm I indi¤erent between playing qI1 = 0 or q
I
1 = 1 i.e., 
I
 
qI1 = 0

= I
 
qI1 = 1

whereI
 
qI1 = 0

= 

pII2 +
 
1  pII (1  n) andI  qI1 = 1 =  pIIn+  1  pII1 :
At the same time the probability pI must make rm II indi¤erent between playing qII1 = 0 or
qII1 = 1 i.e., 
II
 
qII1 = 0

= II
 
qII1 = 1

where II
 
qII1 = 0

and II
 
qII1 = 1

are identi-
cal to I
 
qI1 = 0

and I
 
qI1 = 1

with pI in place of pII : After some algebra the equilibrium
probabilities immediately follow. Finally, the bounds are found by checking the conditions
0  pI = pII  1 and recalling that n > 1=2 by assumption. Next, we show that for n  n;
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qI1 = q
II
1 = 1 is an equilibrium. Indeed, for q
I
1 = q
II
1 = 1 the only possible deviations are
for q < 1 which would at most guarantee prots  (1  n) to the deviating channel: Then,
qI1 = q
II
1 = 1 is an equilibrium if 2 >  (1  n) ; that is if n  n: Instead qI1 = qII1 = 0
would be an equilibrium if 2 > n; that is if n  c2c+V  = 1   n but since n > 1=2 by
assumption this is never the case. We now show that there are no other pure strategy Nash equi-
libria. Assume there exist an equilibrium with qI1 > q
II
1 (di¤erent from (q
I
1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0)) then
channel I would get prots n (1  t1) and channel II would get prots  (1  n) (1  t2) :
This is never an equilibrium for (1  t1) and/or (1  t2) smaller than 1: In that case I and/or
II could deviate and get a larger audience by increasing qI1 and/or decreasing q
II
1 : This is always
true since t1 is non-increasing in q while t

2 is non-decreasing in q and there are some q such that
t1 = t

2 = 0: If instead, (1  t1) and (1  t2) both equal 1; again this cannot be an equilibrium:
Indeed, since n > 1
2
channel II; would prot from deviating to a qI1 < q
II
1 because this de-
viation would get n which is more than the candidate equilibrium payo¤  (1  n). Notice
that this reasoning does not work if qI1 is already equal to 1 as in (q
I
1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0). A similar
reasoning shows that there is never an equilibrium for qI1 < q
II
1 : Assume now that there exist an
equilibrium with qI1 = q
II
1 (di¤erent from q
I
1 = q
II
1 = 1) then both channels would get prots
 [n (1  t1) + (1  n) (1  t2)] =2: In this case the best possible deviation would be to satisfy
completely (1  ti = 1) the most protable group. Therefore, since n > 12 ; (that is group 1 is
the more protable group), a deviation to a q > qI1 = q
II
1 would give to the deviating channel a
prot of n: Then, qI1 = q
II
1 will be an equilibrium if  [n (1  t1) + (1  n) (1  t2)] =2 > n
and this is not possible for n > 1
2
even if (1  t1) = (1  t2) = 1:
We now show what happens to the size of the interval for which specialization on di¤erent
cultural traits occurs
n  1=2 = c+ V   
2c+ V      1=2:
It is immediate to see that the size of the interval decreases with respect to c and  and increases
with respect to V .
Proof of Proposition 5. Competition is now a two stage game which we solve by backward
induction. In the second stage TV rms simultaneously choose their optimal fees after observing
the coverages chosen in the rst stage. Notice that price competition in the second stage does
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not alter the fact that specialization is a dominant strategy in the rst stage, hence we will
only consider qj1 = 0 or q
j
1 = 1 as possible coverages. By usual reasoning rms will choose
s = 0 in the second stage if they concentrate on the same trait. Otherwise, rms will be able to
set positive prices. The maximum price smax is an equilibrium if the rm covering the minority
group (say rm j) does not want to deviate to a lower bs " where bs is the price that would make
the majority group indi¤erent between the two channels, i.e. U1j (0; bs) = U1 j(1; smax) = 0. This
requires that (1  n) ( + smax) > 21 + (bs  ") where 1 is dened by (14) or equivalently
when "! 0 that
n < ns =
c [smax   bs] +  (V   )
 (c+ V   )
Since by assumption  < [smax   bs] this deviation is never protable. Hence if coverages are
di¤erent, rms always choose smax. We therefore can write the normal form of the rst stage as
follows where 1 and 2 are dened by (14) and (15) respectively
Firm II
qI1= 0 q
I
1= 1
Firm I qII1 = 0 2; 2 (1  n) ( + smax) ; n ( + smax)
qII1 = 1 n ( + s
max) ; (1  n) ( + smax) 1; 1
From this payo¤ matrix and following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3 it is
easy to show that: rst, qj1 = 0, q
 j
1 = 1 with s
j = s j = smax are two pure Nash equilibria
for all 1
2
 n  n (smax), (most protable deviation is avoided if (1  n) ( + smax) > 1);
second, qI1 = q
II
1 = 1 with s
I = sII = 0 is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for all n 
n(smax); third, for all 1=2 6 n 6 n(smax), there is also a mixed strategy equilibrium with
pI = pII = (c (1 n)(V )) 2c(1 n)(+s
max)
(2c V+) 2c(+smax) where p
j is the probability with which the minority
group is covered by rm j. Finally, simple algebra shows that n(smax) = 2cs
max+(c+V )
2csmax+(2c+V ) >
c+V 
2c+V  = n: The resulting dynamics are trivial.
Proof of Proposition 6. Competition is a two stage game, where in the second stage only
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rm I chooses its fee and rm II chooses s = 0. By standard arguments rm I will set s = 0 if
qI1 = q
II
2 . If q
I
1 6= qII2 , rm 1 sets a positive fee bs which leaves the trait that gets more coverage
by rm 1 indi¤erent between watching rm Is channel or rm IIs channel which is free. By
the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3, the only possible rst period outcomes
are either qj1 = 0 or q
j
1 = 1. Hence if rms specialise on di¤erent traits bs is determined by
U iI(1; bs) = U iII(0; 0). We can then write the game played in the rst stage as follows where 1
and 2 are dened by (14) and (15) respectively
Firm II
qI1= 0 q
I
1= 1
Firm I qII1 = 0 2; 2 (1  n) ( + bs) ; n
qII1 = 1 n ( + bs) ; (1  n)  1; 1
From this payo¤matrix and following the same steps as in the proof of Propositions 3 and 5
it is simple to show that: rst, qI1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0 with s
I = bs is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
for all 1=2 6 n 6 n; second, for all 1=2  n  n(bs), there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
qI1 = 0; q
II
1 = 1 and s
I = bs; third, qI1 = qII1 = 1 with sI = sII = 0 is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium for all n  n(bs); fourth, for 1
2
6 n 6 n, there is also a mixed strategy equilibrium
with pI = (1 n)(V +2c) c
V  and p
II = 2c(1 n)(+bs) (c (1 n)(V ))
(V )+2cbs where pj is the probability
with which the minority group is covered by rm j. Finally, to show that n(smax) > n(bs) > n
it is su¢ cient to notice that n(s) = 2cs+(c+V )
2cs+(2c+V ) is increasing in s; that n(s) tends to n when
s goes to zero and that smax > bs: The resulting dynamics are trivial.
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Parents, Television and Cultural Change
Esther Hauk Giovanni Immordinoy
Online appendix
1 Intoduction
This online appendix provides more details and all the proofs of our robustness analysis. Section
2 presents the formal proofs of the Propositions (which we state again for completeness) when the
rms choose the entertainment value endogenously. Section 3 postulates a specic functional form
to an extention discussed in the Conclusion when cultural intolerance evolves over time. Section 4
provides the formal analysis when cultural groups are heterogeneous in advertisement sensitivity
and cultural intolerance. All formal proofs of Section 4 are relegated to the nal Section 5.
2 Endogenous entertainment
Proposition (monopoly): If k < =c the monopolist chooses H if the majority is not too
big, i.e. n < 1  (ck=2) and L otherwise. For k  =c high quality is never chosen.
Proof. Following the same steps as in our baseline model it is easy to show that he two possible level
of prot are H = 
h
n+ (1  n)

1  V 2H
c
i
  k and L = 
h
n+ (1  n)

1  V 2L
c
i
.
The media rm will prefer the high entertainment level if and only if H  L which is equivalent to
n  bn = 1  ck
2
: High quality can only be an equilibrium outcome if bn > 1
2
, k < 
2
.
Proposition (competitive entertainment): Let k  [ (c  (V   L) + 2H)] =2c. For
a su¢ ciently big majority group n  nk where
nk =
 (c+ V   H) + 2ck
 (2c+ V   H)
(1)
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both rms will choose H and concentrate on covering the majority (q
I
1 = q
II
1 = 1) leading to
the long-run elimination of the minority. Otherwise rms will provide L and will specialise on
di¤erent traits, so that group sizes remain constant.
Proof. The possibility to choose entertainment in the second stage does not alter the fact that covering
only one trait is a dominant strategy in the rst stage, hence we will only consider qj1 = 0 or q
j
1 = 1 as
possible coverages. We start by looking at the second stage. If qI1 = q
II
1 then there is always an equilibrium
in which both rms choose H . There might also be an equilibrium in which both rms choose L. In
particular, qI1 = q
II
1 = 1 and L is an equilibrium if 
L
1 > 2
H
1   k , n < 1  c( 2k)(V 2H+L) = nk.
Similarly, qI1 = q
II
1 = 0 and L is an equilibrium if 
L
2 > 2
H
2   k , n > c( 2k)(V 2H+L) = 1  nk;
where l1 and 
l
2 for l = L;H are obtained from
1 = [c  (1  n) (V   )] =2c
and
2 = [c  n (V   )] =2c
substituting l to :However, these equilibria do not exist if
c( 2k)
(V 2H+L) > 1, or if k <
(c (V L)+2H)
2c
.
If qI1 6= qII1 then both rms will choose L since they are not able to capture any additional demand
by deviating to H : Hence we get the following rst stage payo¤s taking the second stage reactions into
account.
Firm II
qI1= 0 q
I
1= 1
Firm I qII1 = 0 
H
2  k; H2  k (1  n) ; n
qII1 = 1 n; (1  n)  H1  k; H1  k
From this payo¤ matrix and following the same steps as in the proof of Propositions 4 of the main
paper it is easy to show that qI1= q
II
1 = 1 and H is an equilibrium if 
H
1   k > (1  n)  , n >
nk =
(c+V H)+2ck
(2c+V H) while for
1
2
< n < nk rms diversify their coverage. The resulting dynamics is
trivial.
3 Evolving cultural intolerance
Let V0 = V > 2 and cultural intolerance evolve according to V it+1 = V
i
t + " where " is positive
for qit  12 and negative otherwise. The majority who gets more coverage in t = 0, becomes culturally
more intolerant while the minority becomes more tolerant. Hence it becomes harder / easier to induce
the majority / minority to watch TV. Nevertheless, the monopolist still induces full TV time from the
majority: the cuto¤ for optimality of this strategy even shrinks to n1 > (V   ") =2V . As time
2
passes this cuto¤ shrinks further to (V   t") =2V where t is the current time period. The initial
majority keeps radicalizing, growing and getting more coverage while the initial minority keeps shrinking
and becomes more tolerant every period, namely (V   t") where t is the current time period. It might
even become so tolerant that full TV time can be captured from both traits. Nevertheless it disappears in
the long run, since the majority requires more coverage every period. Similar results hold, if the change in
cultural intolerance was weighted by TV time only that the radicalization of the majority would happen
at a higher speed than the deradicalization of the minority.
If positive reinforcement required more than half the coverage, namely qt > q >
1
2
, the dynamics is
similar if the majority is su¢ ciently big, i.e. q1(t = 0) > q. For a smaller majority both traits are likely
to survive in the long run. The exact results depend on the assumption we make concerning the evolution
of cultural intolerance. If cultural intolerance remains constant for intermediate levels of coverage the
survival of both traits depends whether qb1  q. If yes, the dynamics converges to qb1. If no, the minority
will still be eliminated in the long run since there will be a point in time t such that qt > q. However, if
the lack of coverage leads to more cultural tolerance, then both groups will become su¢ ciently tolerant
over time that the monopolist can capture full TV time of both groups. In this case the group size is
totally determined by the TV coverage with long run survival of both traits.
4 Heterogeneous cultural groups
We introduce two additional sources of heterogeneity: advertisement sensitivity and the degree
of cultural intolerance. Let 1 =  and 2 =  with  > 0 where  describes the relative
advertisement protability of a member of group 2 relative to a member of group 1. LetV1 = V
and V2 = V; where the parameter  measures the relative cultural intolerance of group 2 with
respect to group 1. Observe that the protability of a group now depends on the size of the group,
on the relative advertisement sensitivity of the group and the groups relative cultural intolerance
and we therefore can no longer present results in terms of the majority group. Without loss of
generality we assume   1; i.e. group 1 is culturally more intolerant. We will focus on V > 2
so that the media industry cannot capture full TV time by both cultural traits. These assumptions
result in the following restriction on :
min = = (V   )    max = 1. (2)
Under this characterization a monopolistic media industry maximises
 = max
qi
 [n (1  t1) + (1  n) (1  t2)] : (3)
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Following the same steps as in Proposition 1 of the main paper it is easy to show that a monopolistic
TV industry will give more coverage to the more protable group to capture its entire TV time.
More formally, for n  en (where n is the size of group 1) the optimal coverage is qa1 = 1   qa2 =
qa = =V and only trait 1 invests in education while for n > en the optimal coverage is
qb1 = q
b = 1  =V and only trait 2 invests in education where
en = 
1 + 
= 1  1
1 + 
: (4)
Since higher  and  increase group 2s protability, the threshold en is increasing in  and .
Therefore, for given group sizes, an increase in the relative advertisement sensitivity of one group
with respect to the other and/or an increase in its relative cultural intolerance increases the
probability that this group gets more coverage.
The dynamics of the cultural trait 1 is still driven by
nt+1 = nt (t1 + (1  t1)q1) + (1  nt)(1  t2)q1
but now - since we have two possible coverages - we have two steady state candidates, namely
na =
c
V
c V  1  
V
2
+ 
 
1  
V
 (5)
and
nb = 1 
c
V
c  V  1  
V
2
+ 
 
1  
V
 : (6)
Notice that these potential steady states are always interior.1 Also, they are independent of
the advertisement sensitivity  because neither coverage nor optimal TV time depend on . Also
Lemma 1 na  nb
Proof. See Section 5.
However the threshold en dened by (4) which determines whether the TV industry chooses
qa or qb is not guaranteed to fall in between the two steady states candidates. On the one hand,
a low (high) advertisement sensitivity might push en below na (above nb) which is una¤ected by
changes in . On the other hand, changes in the groups relative cultural intolerance a¤ect bothen and the steady state candidates. Specically, while a decrease in  leads to a lower en, both na
1For 0 < na < 1 we need c >
V  
 = V       while for 0 < nb < 1 we need c > V      .
Both conditions are guaranteed by Assumption 1 (in the paper) that In this more general setting should be c 
V     V     0:
4
and nb increase,
2 meaning that group 1 gets larger in the steady state candidates because group
2 becomes relatively less intolerant.
This gives rise to three cases: (i) if na  en  nb , initial group size determines which steady
state is reached : na is reached if the initial size is smaller than en; while nb is reached otherwise.
(ii) If en > nb the system always converges to na. (iii) If en < na the system always converges to nb .
Proposition 1 derives the parameter conditions on  and  for which cases 1, 2 and 3 occur.
Proposition 1 (Steady states) There exist thresholds a; b; c; a and b; (all given in the
proof) such that the steady states are as follows:
1. for  < a the system converges to nb ;
2. for a    b the system converges to nb for min   < a while for a    max the
system converges to na whenever the initial n0 < en and converges to nb otherwise;
3. for b <   c we get the following subcases:
(a) for min   < a the system converges to nb ;
(b) for a    b the system converges to na whenever the initial n0 < en and converges
to nb otherwise;
(c) for b <   max the system converges to na.
4. for  > c the system converges to na:
In steady state na the media industry chooses coverage q
a and only trait 1 invest in education. In
steady state nb the media industry chooses coverage q
b and only trait 2 parents invest in education.
Proof. See Section 5.
The steady states are illustrated in Figure 1. The picture shows that nb can only be an equi-
librium if group 2 is not too sensitive to advertisement (there is an upper bound on ). Moreover,
if group 2 becomes more culturally intolerant (higher ), this change must be accompanied by a
lower advertisement sensitivity and vice versa. This happens because higher  and  make group
2 more valuable for the media industry relative to group 1. Hence, if these values become too high
the media industry would like to capture group 2s entire TV time resulting in na.
[Include Figure 1 around here]
2Simple calculations show that @n

a
@ < 0 and
@nb
@ < 0.
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The gure nicely illustrates that for any xed  > min as  increases the steady state will
change from nb to a region where convergence depends on the initial size of the groups and nally
to na.
We can therefore derive the following empirical predictions. Increasing the relative advertise-
ment sensitivity of one group with respect to the other and/or its relative cultural intolerance,
increases the probability of moving to a steady state in which this group is larger.
If we allow for a competitive media industry, the analysis of the problem is similar to the
symmetric case except that now we have to look at all possible group sizes since being the majority
is no longer equivalent to being the most protable group. Again for intermediate group sizes now
dened by
nh =
c
c+ c+ V     n  n
h =
 (c+ V   )
 (c+ V   ) + c (7)
the media industry specialises on di¤erent traits while outside this parameter range only the most
protable group is covered. It is instructive to study when both groups are covered. First, notice
that only nh is a¤ected by  and it is increasing in , making specialization on di¤erent traits
most likely for  = 1 when both groups are equally intolerant. The size of the interval for which
specialization on di¤erent cultural traits occurs is
nh   nh = 
 
2   2c + cV + V 2  V  + cV   V 
(c+ c   + V ) (c   + V + c) :
The term in brackets at the numerator can be rewritten as (c+ V   ) (V   ) + c(V   )
and is positive (Assumption 1). Hence, the sign of the derivative with respect to the advertisement
sensitivity  is equal to the sign of the following expression: c (c   + V   c2 + 2   V 2)
which is zero for  = b = p(c +V)(c +V )
c +V  , implying that n
h   nh is increasing for  < b,
decreasing for  > b and largest for  = b: Notice that for  = 1 we have that b = 1 as well.
Indeed, this analysis uncovers that the thresholds on n drift apart, the more equalthe groups are.
If  < 1 meaning that group 1 is more radical than group 2 than this must be countervailed
by a higher sensitivity to advertisement (b > 1) for group 2.
The previous discussion adds a couple of new empirical predictions: A decrease in the size of a
group, its advertisement sensitivity or its degree of cultural intolerance will decrease the probability
that the media industry will concentrate to cover that group. Finally, the comparison between
monopolistic and competitive media industry is una¤ected: competition is still more likely to lead
to cultural extinction.
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5 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that min = V     max = 1. Simple algebra reveals that na = nb
at min while na < n

b at max since n

a(max) < n

b(max) , (V   2) c > (V   2) (V   )
which is always true since c V    V    0 (new Assumption 1). Also both na and nb strictly
decrease in . Therefore if we can show that
@na@ jmin  > @nb@ jmin  we have established that na  nb .
Simple algebra reveals that
@na@ jmin  > @nb@ jmin , (V   )2 ( (3V   4) + V c) > 0 which is
always true since we are in the parameter area where V > 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. The dynamics give us the conditions for stability: na is stable whenever
na  en; while nb is stable whenever en  nb . We rst translate these conditions into restrictions on the
parameter . Since both na and n

b are decreasing while en is increasing in ; simple algebra delivers that
na  en whenever   a where
a =
  (2V   c  )  +
q
2 (2V   c  )2 2 + 4( + c)V (c+   V )
2V (c+   V ) (8)
while en  nb whenever   b where
b =
(V   ) (c+ )
(V   )2 + c: (9)
Moreover both a and b are decreasing in . We then compare these thresholds with the permitted
range of  as dened by min =

V   max = 1 and translate this into restrictions on . Simple
algebra gives us the following results:
 na is always unstable if max[a; max] = a or equivalently if  < a with
a =
c
(V   )(c+ 2  V ) (10)
 nb is always stable if max[b; max] = b or equivalently if   b with
b =
(V   )(c+ 2  V )
c
: (11)
 na is always stable if min[a; min] =a and nb is always unstable if min[b; min] =b; or equiva-
lently if  > c where
c =
(V   )2
2
: (12)
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Since the condition for complete instability for nb and for complete stability for n

a coincide at  > c
dened by (12) whenever nb is completely unstable for all permitted , n

a is completely stable: we are
in case 2. The conditions for complete instability of na; namely  < a dened by (10) and complete
stability of nb ; namely  < b dened by (11) do not coincide, however it can be shown by simple algebra
that a < b, so complete instability of na (namely  < a) implies complete stability of n

b for all
possible : we are in case 3. For a    b we are also in case 3 for min <  < a and in case 1
for a <  < max. Lemma 2 establishes that a  b for b    c, hence we are in case 1 for
a    b, in case 2 for b <   max and in case 3 for min   < a.
Lemma 2 For b <   c it is always the case that a < b.
Proof. We know that for b <  < c both a and b are interior with respect to min and max. We
rst compare a and b in general and then show that if they lie between min and max it must be the
case that b > a. After some reformulation a Q b is equivalent to
4V c (c+   V )  V 2 + 2   2   2V   
V 2 + 2 (1  )  2V  (c + ) + V   2   c2 Q 0:
By new Assumption 1 (c  V     V     0) the rst bracket is positive, hence we have to
look at the second and third bracket only 
V 2 + 2   2   2V    V 2 + 2 (1  )  2V  (c + ) + V   2   c2 Q 0: (13)
Equation (13) tells us that there are two values of , say 1 and 2; for which a = b. Those values
of  can be calculated equating (13) to zero: The zero of the rst bracket of (13) gives 2 which
happens to coincide with c while the zero of the second bracket gives us 1. The rst bracket is
positive
 
V 2 + 2   2   2V  > 0 for  < c dened by (12) which is the condition that both
b > min and a > min. Hence we only need to sign 
V 2 + 2 (1  )  2V  (c + ) + V   2   c2
=
 
(V   )2   2 (c + ) + V   2   c2 (14)
= (V   )2  +   c (V   )2 +  2   c2V   3  2c2: (15)
If we could prove that the sign is negative for b < max and a < max, we would have shown that
b > a. It is clear from (15) that the sign becomes negative for high . From the argument leading to
(11) we know that b < max requires  > b =
(V )(c+2 V )
c
> 1 > c
(V )(c+2 V ) = a. But
the value of (14) at  = 1 is given by  V (c+ ) (c+   V ) < 0 always. Hence, we can conclude
that b > a. In general, the proof shows that a < b if and only if 1 <  < 2.
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The lemma implies that in this last area (b <   c) nb is the only stable steady state for  <
a, while na is the only stable steady state for  > b: In the middle region (a    b) the initial n0
determines which state is reached.
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Figure 1: Convergence to steady states with a monopolistic TV industry
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